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perpetuate, if not increase, the divergence in lower court treatment
of sex-based classifications.
Even though the Court fails to clearly indicate its present posi-
tion on sex discrimination, one message of these recent cases is un-
mistakeable-sex, at least for the present, is not suspect. Perhaps a
majority of the Court wishes to decide sex discrimination cases on an
ad hoc basis, withholding a final resolution of the issue of suspectness
until the country reaches its decision on the Equal Rights Amend-
ment." Justice Powell expressed this view in his concurrence in
Frontiero:
It seems to me that the reaching out to preempt by judicial action
a major political decision which is currently in the process of
resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for the duly pre-
scribed legislative processes.5
For the present, a more precise articulation of the components
of the intermediate model, if indeed the Court is employing one, is
needed to provide more definite guidelines for the lower courts. A
definitive explication of the applicability of the test to sex-based
classifications would significantly subdue the confusion stemming
from the Kahn, Geduldig, and Schlesinger decisions.
Victor Lynn Marcello
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL-LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYERS'
FREEDOM TO TERMINATE
A married female employee sued her employer for damages for
breach of an oral contract of employment which was terminable "at
will" by either party. Hostility on the part of the plaintiff's foreman
resulting from her refusal to go out with him was alleged by plaintiff
to be the cause of her dismissal. Affirming the trial court, the New
Hampshire supreme court held the employer liable for damages, rea-
soning that a termination by the employer of an at will employment
contract "which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
50. The ERA provides: "Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Section 2.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article. Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification." S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. Rxc. 9598 (1972); H.R.J. Res.
208, 92d Cong., ist Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 35815 (1971). The states have until March
22, 1979, to ratify the amendment.
51. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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retaliation . . .constitutes a breach of the employment contract."'
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
The traditional rule that a contract for an uncertain duration is
terminable at will by either party without reference to motive2 has
been applied to employment contracts.' Although the employment
relationship is a species of contract,4 legislatures, seeking to prevent
discrimination based on age,' sex, 'or race,' to protect the right to
unionize,' or to foster various other policies,9 have on occasion inter-
vened to protect at will employment contracts from termination. In
the absence of legislation, however, the courts have usually followed
the general rule and thus have afforded little protection to at will
employment contracts.'"
1. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974). The court, how-
ever, disallowed the portion of the award which included damages for mental suffering
on the basis that such damages are not generally recoverable in a contract action. Id.
at 552. In Louisiana, such damages may be awarded in a contract action. Lewis v.
Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903).
2. See, e.g., E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224
(8th Cir. 1933); Kraftco Corp. v. Kolbus, 274 N.E. 2d 153 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1971);
McGuire v. Nelson Bros., 177 La. 302, 148 So. 56 (1933); Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906).
3. See, e.g., Hickman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Union Labor
Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 112 P. 886 (1910); Lambert
v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 624, 183 S.E. 814 (1936); Pechon v. National Corp. Serv.,
234 La. 397, 100 So. 2d 213 (1958); Garner v. Louisiana State Bd. of Education, 277
So. 2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 279 So. 2d 696 (La. 1973); RESTATEMENT OF
Tomrs § 762 (1939); S. WILISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 39 (1938). Cf. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2747: "A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or
family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also free to depart
without assigning any cause."
4. See, e.g., Comment, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 211 (1973).
5. E.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1970).
6. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. 1972).
7. Id.
8. E.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
9. E.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1970) (prohibiting
discharge because an employee's wages have been garnished); Universal Military
Training & Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 459(c) (1970) (assLring returning veterans their
former employment with the right not to be discharged except for just cause for one
year after their return); LA. R.S. 23:961 (1950) (prohibiting employers with 20 or more
employees from terminating employment because of employee's political activities).
Cf. LA. R S. 23:962 (1950) (prohibiting employer from discharging employee prior to
expiration of term of employment because of employee's political opinions and from
attempting to control employee's vote by means of agreement).
10. See cases cited in note 3 supra. Although one would expect to find an analogy
between the employer-employee and the landlord-tenant situations in that both are
arrangements in which one party traditionally has enjoyed an advantage over the
19751
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Nevertheless, in at least two cases, strong public policy consider-
ations have prompted the court's refusal to recognize the employer's
right to terminate at will. In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,"I
the Indiana supreme court awarded damages to an employee who was
fired in retaliation for exercising her statutory right to collect work-
men's compensation benefits from her employer. A discharge because
of an employee's refusal to commit perjury at the insistence of his
employer was considered actionable by the California appellate court
in Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396.12 Both courts emphasized that
the policies sought to be protected were of sufficient weight to have
been buttressed by civil or criminal legislation and thus were willing
to create a narrow exception to the traditional rule.
The decision in the instant case could be viewed as a further,
although broadened, recognition of the tendency to limit the power
of termination in favor of countervailing notions of public policy. It
could be argued that the interest in discouraging inducements by the
employer which take advantage of his employee's sex or threaten to
disrupt her marital relationship is comparable to that recognized in
the Frampton or Petermann cases. However, the New Hampshire
court did not grant relief in order to prevent circumvention of a spe-
cific statutory policy but declared that bad faith dismissals were not
in "the best interest of the economic system or the public good."'"
Employees are certain to urge courts in other jurisdictions to abandon
the traditional rule, and the rationales which have been advanced to
support a cause of action will be critically examined.
A limitation on the power of termination of an at will agreement
could be discussed in the language of contract. It may be convincingly
argued, for instance, that every at will contract is subject to an im-
plied condition that it cannot be terminated for reasons which con-
travene vital public policy. Such an implied condition could be re-
garded as a recognition that certain social or economic policies are
stronger than the policy of allowing parties unbridled freedom to
other, the courts have exhibited greater solicitude for the tenant. See, e.g., Edwards
v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 650 (1971); Wilkins v. Tebbetts, 216 So. 2d 477 (Fla. App. 1968); Sargent v. Ross,
113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971);
Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
11. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
12. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
13. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); Peter-
mann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).
14. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
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contract. It may be advisable, however, to resort to such a limitation
only with caution.
If such a power is to be recognized, should it be restricted to the
protection of the employee? There may be instances in which the
employee's arbitrary termination of an at will contract can cause
considerable harm to his employer, and the employer would argue
that he should likewise be accorded protection. There come to mind
exclusive agency contracts of long standing whose arbitrary termina-
tion by the representative could work a serious injury on the principal
by leaving him suddenly without representation in an important
trade area. Sound business judgment in the interest of flexibility
frequently dictates that certain agency agreements be left vague or
informal as to termination. Abuse of such latitude, if prompted by
some predatory interest of the agent, might well be discountenanced
by a court. 5
A policy that delimits the power to terminate an at will employ-
ment contract implicitly recognizes the notion that the contract can
be terminated for some purposes but not for others. This poses a
difficult question: what purposes are to be recognized? Although in
the instant case the court indicated that the employer's "bad faith
or malice" in discharging the employee was of controlling impor-
tance,"6 significantly, it offered no suggestion as to the intended
meaning of these terms. 7 Since the plaintiff was a married woman,
the foreman's urging could have been construed as an invitation to
immoral behavior. Perhaps the court's attitude would have been less
15. Cf. A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165
N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957), in which the representative had contracts with his employees and
with his manufacturer. When the employees and the manufacturer conspired in a plan
to set up a competitive dealership through resources of plaintiff's business, the plain-
tiff's need for protection against termination of the contracts was recognized in the
context of third party interference with contractual relations. However, since there is
generally a relative equality of bargaining power between the parties in such business
relationships, it may be argued that there is no necessity for judicial intervention.
16. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
17. In the context of interference with contractual relations, Professor Prosser has
stated: "Here, as so often elsewhere in the law of torts, the law has been vexed with
the unhappy word 'malice.' . . . [iUt now has all shades of meaning from active
malevolence, through an intent to profit at the expense of the plaintiff, to a mere intent
with knowledge of his interests to do an act which will have the effect of interfering
with them. Obviously such a term is to be avoided for the sake of clarity." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 928 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). See also id.
§§ 113, 119; Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort
Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 563 (1959); Fridman, Malice in the Law of Torts, 21 MOD.
L. REv. 484 (1958); Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 1041 (1935); Jaffin,
Theorems in Anglo-American Labor Law, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 1104 (1931).
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protective if the employee had been a single woman. One is led to
conjecture even further as to what the consequences would have been
if the employee had been dismissed because of her physical appear-
ance, moral attributes or social behavior outside of the employment
relationship.
Although the court in the principal case expressly relied upon
breach of contract as the basis for its decision,"8 the question remains
whether the same result might appropriately have been reached
under some tort theory. 9 Certainly the interest of a party in the
enjoyment of an at will contract has been protected under tort theory
in those instances where a third person has intervened and induced
a breach.20 In such cases, however, the claim is against someone who
is not a contracting party and yet has intermeddled with the affairs
of those who have contracted for their own benefit.2'
In addition, a recovery based on tort might arguably be rational-
ized in terms of the so-called prima facie tort doctrine," under which
intentional or malicious harm not falling within one of the specific
tort classifications has been regarded as actionable in the absence of
some affirmative showing of justification for the defendant's con-
duct. 3 In the Frampton case heretofore discussed, the Court's lan-
18. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974). For discussion of
other contractually related grounds which have been suggested as affording possible
bases for liability in abusive discharge cases, see Blades, Employment at Will vs.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 1404, 1419-21 (1967); Comment, 23 BuFFALo L. REv. 211, 231-40 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (dicta). See
generally Blades, supra note 18, at 1421-27.
20. E.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); American Sur. Co. v. Schottenbauer,
257 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1958); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala.
147, 89 So. 732 (1921); Mendelson v. Blatz Brewing Co., 9 Wis. 2d 487, 101 N.W.2d
805 (1960). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766(b) (1939). Louisiana, however, is the
only remaining American jurisdiction where inducement of breach of contract is not
regarded as an actionable wrong. Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 8 So. 2d 361 (1942);
Roussel Pump & Elec. Co. v. Sanderson, 216 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
21. "The defendant's breach of his own contract with the plaintiff is of course not
a basis for the tort." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 934 (4th ed. 1971).
22. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 177 (Pa. 1974) (dicta);
Blades, supra note 18, at 1421-27. See also Workmen's Compensation-Employer's
Tort Liability-Indiana Supreme Court Allows Workman Tort Remedy Against
Former Employer for Retaliatory Discharge After Employee Filed Workmen's Com-
pensation Claim, 35 A.T.L.A. L.J. 150, 162 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904); Advance Music Corp. v.
American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946); Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236
N.Y. 80, 140 N.E, 203 (1923). See also Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111
So. 55 (1926); Graham v. St. Charles St. R.R., 47 La. Ann. 214, 16 So. 806 (1895). See
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guage is suggestive of such an approach." Indeed, the majority ob-
served, without elaboration, that "such a discharge would constitute
an intentional, wrongful act on the part of the employer for which the
injured employee is entitled to be fully compensated in damages."25
Nevertheless, the prima facie tort theory, although staunchly
sponsored in many quarters,2" has not been accorded general recogni-
tion in most jurisdictions.27 Thus, it is far from certain that the courts
will use the approach to justify a departure of such potential signifi-
cance to the employment relationship.
Shelly Crittendon Zwick
generally Brown, supra note 17; Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort"
Cause of Action, 42 CORN. L.Q. 65 (1957); Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1894); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 503 (1952). Closely akin to this
doctrine is the civil law principle of abuse of right which is based on the notion that a
right is limited not only in its extent, but also in its exercise, and that there is therefore
an abuse of right if it is exercised solely with the intention of injuring another. See
generally Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMH. L.J. 22 (1933); Mayrand, Abuse of
Rights in France and Quebec, 34 LA. L. Rv. 993 (1974); Walton, Motive as an
Element in Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law, 22 HAjv. L. Rv. 501 (1909).
In Louisiana, however, application of this principle has been limited to cases involving
abuse of the right of ownership of property. See, e.g., Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v.
Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919); Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935). See
also Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage: Articles 667-69
& 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REv. 195 (1974).
24. See text at note 11 supra.
25. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973).
26. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17; Forkosch, supra note 23; Halpern, Intentional
Torts and the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 7 (1957); Holmes, Privilege, Malice and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1894).
27. See, e.g., Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1967).
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